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Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations: What are
the Legitimate Expectations from the
WTO?
Qingjiang Kong*
INTRODUCTION
On December 11, 2001, China acceded to the World Trade
Organization (WTO).1 Taiwan followed on January 1, 2002 as
the "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen
and Matsu."2 Accession of both China and Taiwan to the world
trading body has triggered a fever of activities by Taiwanese
businesses, but the governments on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait have been slow to make policy adjustments. The coexis-
tence of business enthusiasm and governmental indifference
* Professor of International Economic Law, Zhejiang Gongshang University (previ-
ously: Hangzhou University of Commerce), China. His recent book is China and the
World Trade Organization: A Legal Perspective (New Jersey, London, Singapore,
Hong Kong, World Scientific Publishing, 2002). Questions or comments may be e-
mailed to Professor Kong at qkong2000@yahoo.com. He wishes to thank Meghan
Ryan, David P. Weber, and John Kelly for their insightful comments and editorial
assistance. He gratefully acknowledges that without their excellent professional
work, the article would not appear as it is. Of course, the author remains responsi-
ble for all the mistakes and errors.
1. China submitted the Instrument of Ratification on the Protocol on the Ac-
cession of the People's Republic of China to the WTO's Ministerial Conference in
Doha on November 11, 2001. World Trade Organization, Accession of the People's
Republic of China, WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001), available at http://docsonline.wto.orgt
DdfDocuments/t/WTL/432.doc. The Protocol entered into force on December 11,
2001, and pursuant to paragraph 1 Part 1 of the Protocol, China became a member
of the WTO on December 11, 2001. Id.
2. World Trade Organization, Accession of the Separate Customs Territory of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, WT/L/433 (Nov. 23, 2001), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DdfDocuments/t/WT/L/433.doc [hereinafter Accession of
Taiwan Territories]. Taiwan submitted its Ratification on the Protocol on the Acces-
sion of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu to
the WTO's Secretariat on December 1, 2001. Id. The Protocol entered into force on
January 1, 2002 and Taiwan became a member of the WTO on January 1, 2002. Id.
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may be attributed to the combination of a favorable business
environment and unresolved political contentions over the rec-
ognition of Taiwan's status. The post-WTO diplomatic struggle
between China and Taiwan over Taipei's recognition in the
WTO poses a question of whether the WTO can accommodate
both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 3 China has insisted that im-
plementing direct cross-strait talks requires Taiwan accept the
"One China" policy.4 But Taipei's Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) government has called the "One China" provision unac-
ceptable.
3. Nations' representative offices to the WTO, based in Geneva, are accorded
the status of diplomatic missions. Taiwan had operated its "Permanent Mission of
the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu" until Feb-
ruary 2003 when Mr. Supachai Panitchpakdi, Director-General of the WTO, met
with Taiwan's representative to the body, Yen Ching-chang, to issue three demands:
(1) that the title of Taiwan's mission be changed to "office," which is the ti-
tle used by Hong Kong and Macau; (2) that members of the Taiwan mission
refrain from using the customary diplomatic titles and ranks; and (3) that
Taiwan refrain from using any words in WTO-related documents such as
the country's name or references to its central government that imply that
Taiwan is a sovereign country.
Laurence Eyton, Status Quo: Beijing, Taipei and the WTO, ASIA TIMES, at
http://www.atimes.com (last visited Oct. 9, 2004). Supachai based his demand on a
1992 agreement by the General Council of the WTO's predecessor, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), when it was decided that the representa-
tion of Chinese Taipei in GATT would "be along the same lines as that of Hong Kong
and Macau" during the course of its status as an observer and subsequently as con-
tracting-party delegation and "titles carried by its representatives would not have
any implication on the issue of sovereignty." Taiwan News, Taiwan Rebuffs Pres-
sure to Alter the WTO Moniker, available at http://www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/
20030529pl.html (May 29, 2003). Taipei, however, insisted that the Director Gen-
eral's demands were a direct result of pressure from Beijing. Id. See generally
GATT, infra note 7.
4. As to the definition of "One China," the Chinese government's original posi-
tion is that "[t]here is one China in the world. The People's Republic of China repre-
sents that China, and Taiwan is part of China." Su Wei, Some Reflections on the
One-China Principle, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1169, 1169 (2000). This definition is
still valid when used in the world community. However, since the pro-independence
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power in 2000, China has amended the
definition in hopes of gaining the support of the Taiwanese people for its "One
China" principle. See id. at 1176-77. This amended version is that there is only one
China, that Taiwan is part of China, and that China's sovereignty and territory can
not be severed. Id. From a purely legal perspective, the "Republic of China" helmet
that Taiwan carries cannot easily be transformed into a "Republic of Taiwan" system
and it would be even more difficult to transform Taiwan and China into a "one coun-
try, two system" hypothesis, unless a constitutional revolution takes place. See
Hongdah Su, The EU Experience and the Cross-strait Integration: Establishing a Bi-
lateral Commercial Dispute Settlement Mechanism within the WTO Framework, 40
ISSUES & STUD. 1, 7 (2001).
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I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHINA AND TAIWAN IN THE
WTO
The relationship between China and Taiwan in the WTO
should be, in theory, no different from the normal relationship
between WTO members. The de facto relationship between the
two members, however, contributes to a deviation from such a
normal course in the context of cross-strait rivalry. While
Taipei finds Taiwan's existence as a "Separate Customs Terri-
tory" an isolated victory in expanding its political presence and
impact, Beijing is traditionally unaccepting of any Taiwanese
expansion toward a political presence distinct from China. Re-
cent Chinese actions and omissions, however, indicate that Bei-
jing's position may be evolving toward one more accepting of
Taipei's political maneuvering.
A. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WTO MEMBERS
The WTO Agreement 5 generally does not allow its members
to make any reservations. 6 Exceptions provided by the Multi-
lateral Trade Agreements in the WTO are limited to a few cases
such as national security.7 A member can be exempt from en-
forcing the provisions of the WTO Agreement if it considers the
provisions contrary to essential security interests or to pursu-
ance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the
maintenance of international peace and security.8 Except for
national security or other specified reasons, the WTO Agree-
5. For a survey of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Agreement
and the Multilateral Trade Agreements, see GATT Secretariat, THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS (WTO
1995) (1994), available at http://wwwwto.org/english/docse/legal-e/legal-e.htm.
6. A "reservation" is a legal term, which means that a country acceding to an
international treaty reserves the right not to be bound by the "reserved" article or
articles of the treaty. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 113 (2d pocket ed. 2001). Article
XVI (5) of Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization states that
[nlo reservations may be made in respect of any provision of this Agree-
ment. Reservations in respect of any of the provisions of the Multilateral
Trade Agreements may only be made to the extent provided for in those
Agreements. Reservations in respect of a provision of a Plurilateral Trade
Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of that Agreement.
Supra note 5.
7. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947,
55 U.N.T.S. 194, 266 [hereinafter GATT]; General Agreement on Trade in Services,
art. XIV, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex. 1B, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S.
183, 194-95 [hereinafter GATS Agreement].
8. WTO Agreement, supra note 7, art. XIV, § 1.
20041
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ment is binding on all the members, subject to Article XIII of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, which
authorizes a member to opt not to apply the WTO Agreement
with respect to its, relations with another member. 9 Therefore,
the WTO Agreement can be regarded as binding international
law on its members, or at least as special international law, ap-
plicable to trade relations among members that do not exclude
the application of the Agreement as between themselves. This
means both that a country may not act contrary to this interna-
tional law, and that if a country violates this international law,
it will bear all legal consequences arising from the breach, such
as providing compensation to other affected countries and even
being retaliated against.
Furthermore, the WTO Agreement specifically requires its
members to align their domestic laws with the provisions of the
WTO Agreement;10 it requires members to inform the relevant
WTO committee of any measures affecting its obligations under
relevant Multilateral Trade Agreements, 1 and to give favorable
consideration to other members' requests for consultation. 12
B. DE FACTO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHINA AND TAIWAN IN
THE WTO
The current arrangement permits different interpretations
of the relationship between China and Taiwan within the WTO.
Taiwan's status as "Separate Customs Territory"'13 under the
name of "Chinese Taipei" allows China to interpret Taiwan's
status in the WTO as a separate customs territory of China
similar to Hong Kong or Macau.14 The relation between Beijing
9. See WTO Agreement, supra note 7, art. XIII, § 1 ('This Agreement and the
Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annexes 1 and 2 shall not apply as between any
Member and any other Member if either of the Members, at the time either becomes
a Member, does not consent to such application.").
10. WTO Agreement, supra note 7, art. XVI, § 4.
11. See, e.g., Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 326 [hereinafter TRIPS Agree-
ment].
12. See, e.g., GATS Agreement, supra note 7, art. XXII, § 1; Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 4, § 2, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 404.
13. See Accession of Taiwan Territories, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
14. With the entry into force of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Ques-
tion of Hong Kong and the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration on the Question of
Macau, Hong Kong, and Macau have been legally established as Chinese territories.
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and Taipei in the WTO is equal but asymmetrical, similar to the
"One China, Separate Interpretations" principle-the notion
that both Beijing and Taipei agree that there is just one unified
China, but disagree as to which center is the legitimate repre-
sentative of China. 15 The WTO is supposed to be able to provide
the arena for self-justification for either side as long as there is
to be a minimal d6tente across the Taiwan Strait. An example
of the subsurface tension lies within the term for the Taiwanese
capital, itself. The English expression "Chinese Taipei" can be
translated two different ways into the Chinese language. It is
often termed as "Chunghua Taipei" in Taiwan, which has only
cultural connotations, and "Taipei of China" in China, which
conveys a political connotation. 16
China and Taiwan did not exclude the application of the
WTO Agreement as between themselves when they joined the
WTO. In principle, both are bound by the WTO Agreement, as
special international law, in their trade relations with each
other. In practice, however, as international law is by nature
law among nations, it will not be accepted as binding norms on
cross-strait relations by China as long as Taiwan is seen as a
renegade province.' 7 In these circumstances, the legal effect of
Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, Government Printer,
Hong Kong (Dec. 19, 1984); Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Re-
public of China and the Government of the Republic of Portugal on the Question of
Macao, Government Printing Bureau (Macao SAR) (2004), available at
http://www.imprensa.macau.gov.molbo/i/88/23/dc/en/. Therefore, it is indisputable
that they are viewed as "Separate Customs Territories of China" in the WTO con-
text. In fact, they have identified their missions to the WTO as "Representative Of-
fices," which carry no diplomatic connotations.
15. "One China, Separate Interpretations" is supposedly the consensus agreed
to in oral form by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of China (i.e. Taiwan), with the Kuomingtang Party as the
ruling party in 1993. Central News Agency, SEF Head May Repeat 'One China,
Separate Interpretations' , available at http://taiwansecurity.org/CNA/2001/CNA-
033001.htm (Mar. 30, 2001). However, the DPP has disputed the existence of the
consensus since the Party came to power in 2000. Id. "One China, Separate Inter-
pretations" means that both sides of the Taiwan Strait recognize that there is only
one China but either side may claim to be the legitimate representative of China.
Id. The jargon provides the minimum accommodating atmosphere for the two rivals
to coexist across the Taiwan Strait before they decide to unify in the future. See
generally http://news.xinhuanet.conmziliao/2003-01/23/content_704742.htm (last vis-
ited Sept. 29, 2004).
16. A recent example with China is that, in its notification addressed to Taipei
concerning antidumping and a temporary safeguard measure investigation, Beijing
changed Taiwan's official English name of "Chinese Taipei" in the WTO into 'Taipei,
China" in the Chinese language. Cf. supra note 3 and accompanying text.
17. As a matter of fact, it is because of the political classification that interna-
tional law, as has developed so far, cannot provide a solution to the impasse of the
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the WTO Agreement is compromised in cross-strait trade rela-
tions.
1. Taipei's Approach
When Taiwan was under Chiang Kai-shek's authoritarian
regime, its government claimed to be the legitimate government
of the whole of China, including mainland China and Taiwan,
and thus took a hostile and uncompromising attitude towards
mainland China in international arenas even at the expense of
its own diplomatic space.'8 Since it began democratizing in the
late 1980s, Taiwan has spared no effort to boost its image and
expand its diplomatic space-for example, by applying for mem-
bership in the United Nations. As a result of Chinese counter-
measures, Taiwan's efforts to expand its diplomatic space have
thus far produced little effect except for its WTO accession. Due
to China's compromise with the international trading commu-
nity for the sake of its own entry into the WTO, 19 acceding to the
WTO has, to a degree, become Taiwan's only victory in its efforts
to join international organizations. 20
Taiwan issue. This highlights the dilemma in the context of international law.
Theories of modern international law do not provide any clue to the Taiwan issue.
In international law and its theories, rules concerning state succession are irrele-
vant to this issue. Also, rules regarding the succession of governments do not apply.
Again, neither rules concerning insurgence nor national determination are instru-
mental to the Taiwan issue. For a discussion of the relationship between interna-
tional law and the Taiwan issue, see Su, supra note 4, at 10-11.
18. "Diplomatic space" is a generally accepted term used to describe Taiwan's
efforts to have its voice heard in the international forum. Taiwan's withdrawal of its
membership in the name of "Republic of China" at the turn of the admission of the
"People's Republic of China" into the United Nations was an example of Taiwan tak-
ing a hostile and uncompromising attitude toward the Mainland at the expense of its
own diplomatic space.
19. China was reluctant to block Taiwan's accession to the WTO for two main
reasons. First, it aspired to join the WTO, and therefore needed to compromise with
existing WTO members on Taiwan's WTO accession. Second, the WTO is basically
concerned with trade issues. Therefore, once Taiwan's status in the WTO was identi-
fied as a "Separate Customs Territory," China did not act as usual in association
with Taiwan's membership in an international organization.
20. The post-WTO era witnessed another failed endeavor by Taiwan to join in-
ternational organizations. During the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
crisis of 2003, Taipei again applied for membership in the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO). But Beijing thwarted Taipei's attempt in a quick move, despite the
support of the U.S. Congress, which passed a bill mandating the U.S. government to
seek ways for Taiwan to enter the WHO. See An Act Concerning Participation of
Taiwan in the World Health Organization, Pub. L. No. 108-28, 117 Stat. 769 (2003).
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According to some observers, Taipei has attempted to use
the WTO framework to regulate cross-strait economic rela-
tions.21 It is understood that the administration of the DPP, the
current pro-independence party, views the ability to talk with
China on equal footing as evidence of Taiwan's de facto inde-
pendence. 22 In this regard, no better opportunity can be pro-
vided for Taipei than the WTO. Needless to say, talks with
China in disregard of China's precondition of the "One China"
principle helps create an impression that Taipei is on par with
Beijing. 23 Taiwan has insisted on negotiating with China under
the framework of the WTO since its accession. 24 Taipei is also
cautious of any efforts by China to downgrade Taiwan's position
in any international arena. It insists that its WTO mission in
Geneva carry out bilateral trade consultations with China under
its official name, regardless of Beijing's acceptance or opposi-
tion.
2. Beijing's Evolving Approach
Claiming sovereignty over Taiwan, and in accordance with
the "One China" principle, China has attempted to oppose Tai-
wan's membership in any international intergovernmental or-
21. Yin Cunyi & Jiang Shan, Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Mechanism,
52 P.R.C. REV. 4, 11 (2002).
22. John Mo, A Preliminary Study of Cross-Strait Direct Transportation Links
Arranged by Non-Governmental Channels (Sept. 18, 2002) (unpublished manu-
script, submitted to the Annual Conference of China International Economic Law
Society).
23. In November 2002, China notified Taiwan's mission to the WTO of a desire
to discuss exports of cold-rolled steel. In its correspondence, China referred to Tai-
wan's mission as an economic and trade office rather than using its official title.
Taiwan promptly told the Chinese side that it had no obligation or intention to sit
down for talks until requested to do so in the appropriate manner, that is, using the
appropriate title. China subsequently overcame its reluctance to officially recognize
the Taiwanese mission so that talks could start in January 2003.
24. In the words of John C.C. Deng, Vice Chairman of Taiwan's cabinet-level
Mainland Affairs Council, Taipei's official position is:
1. Taiwan is willing to utilize all possible avenues, including the WTO, to
address trade issues encountered by both sides, in order to achieve a nor-
malized trade relationship. 2. For the long-term benefit of the WTO, both
sides shall refrain from raising political issues in the organization. 3. Both
sides should engage each other in a spirit of cooperation. Consultation is
the best means to address problems.
John C.C. Deng, How Will Taiwan Interact with the Mainland under WTO?, Re-
marks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Program, Taiwan: Eco-
nomic Issues Ahead (Feb. 6, 2002), available at http://www.csis.org/asia/eventsw/
020206deng.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
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ganization. On July 27, 2000, in a paper submitted to its WTO
accession working party, China sought to attain support for its
entry into the organization as a sovereign state, while also re-
questing that Taiwan be categorized as a "Separate Customs
Territory of China," but the U.S. Deputy Trade Representative,
Rita Hayes, rejected this proposal. 25 As illustrated in an unoffi-
cial WTO document, China offered a package concerning Tai-
wan's and its own memberships in the multilateral trading
body; both China and Taiwan would obtain membership, but
Taiwan would join the trading body as a separate customs terri-
tory and would obtain membership after China.26 In theory, it
would have been less problematic for China if it had been able to
claim that Taiwan was a province of China. At the time, how-
ever, China had not had the chance to insert the Protocol on the
Accession of the People's Republic of China-a "One China" pro-
vision regarding the post-WTO cross-strait trade arrangement.
Otherwise, China would have been able to forcefully argue that
cross-strait trade be viewed as trade within one country and
therefore the WTO Agreement should not be applied as between
China and Taiwan. 27
25. China, US at Loggerheads over WTO Entry Wording, PEOPLE'S DAILY,
available at http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/200007128/eng20000728_46739.html
(July 28, 2000); see also U.S. Rejects China's WTO Powerplay, Haoyah.com, at
http://www.haoyah.com/Englishlnews/e-asia8.asp (quoting U.S. Trade Representa-
tive Rita Hayes, "[t]he U.S. position is that we cannot accept the language that
China has put forth on Taiwan") (last visited Oct. 17, 2004).
26. In early 1965, Taiwan requested and was granted observer status at ses-
sions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947). In 1971, this
status was revoked, following a decision by the UN General Assembly that recog-
nized the People's Republic as the only legitimate government of China. At its Sep-
tember 1992 meeting, the GATT's Council of Representatives decided to establish a
separate working party to examine the request for accession of the Separate Cus-
toms Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu ("Chinese Taipei"). The
Chairman said he had carried out extensive consultations on the subject of estab-
lishing a working party. He noted that all contracting parties had acknowledged the
view that there was only one China, as expressed in the United Nations General As-
sembly Resolution 2758 of 25 October 1971. Many contracting parties, therefore,
had agreed with the view of the People's Republic of China (PRC) that Chinese
Taipei, as a separate customs territory, should not accede to the GATT before the
PRC itself. Some contracting parties had not shared this view. There had been,
however, a general desire to establish a working party for Chinese Taipei. See
World Trade Organization, China's accession to the WTO and its relationship to the
Chinese Taipei accession and to Hong Kong and Macau, China, CHINA 1-2 (2001).
27. Article 43 of the Foreign Trade Law specifically provides that this Law,
which governs "foreign trade," does not apply to separate customs territories of the
People's Republic of China.
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In principle, if WTO members were persuaded to prevent
Taiwan from invoking the WTO Agreement in its trade relation
with China, this would have helped to strengthen the impres-
sion that Taiwan is part of China. Intriguingly, Beijing did not
invoke the "non-application" clause of the Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization. 28 One explanation is that
this was the result of a compromise between China and the
WTO community. Another possibility is that China did not
want to invoke the non-application provision because of other
considerations, such as hoping to induce and engage Taiwanese
businessmen and Taipei with tremendous business opportuni-
ties in China in exchange for compromise on certain issues on
the Taiwanese side. 29 However, it could also be related to
China's awareness that exclusion of the application would con-
tradict the purpose of the WTO, or that acceptance of the appli-
cation could even be a gesture of Beijing's good will towards
Taipei and other existing WTO members.30
As a general practice, even in a forum where both Beijing's
and Taipei's representatives are present, Chinese officials have
been unwilling to make contact with Taiwan officials, let alone
hold formal talks on any subject. Beijing is wary that such for-
mal contacts or talks may contribute to creating an impression
that Taiwan is on par with China and may be used by Taiwan to
boost its image or even expand its diplomatic space. China's
diplomatic representatives are very cautious in dealing with
their Taiwanese counterparts on the occasion when both are
present. From the Chinese perspective, Taipei's relentless cam-
paigns to expand its diplomatic space are independence-driven
and thus China must ready itself to block such efforts. Beijing
28. International lawyers often refer to Article XIII of the Agreement Estab-
lishing the WTO as the "non-application clause," which reads: 'This Agreement and
the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annexes 1 and 2 shall not apply as between
any Member and any other Member if either of the Members, at the time either be-
comes a Member, does not consent to such application." WTO Agreement, supra
note 7, art. XIII. This clause does not necessarily relate to "national security."
29. It should be noted that the benefits available to Taiwan result substantially
from the trade liberalization required by the WTO and predicate on the condition
that China agrees to apply the WTO Agreement in its relation with Taiwan.
30. In the process of the accession negotiations, existing members expressed
concern that China and Taiwan's long-standing quarrels would function to politicize
the WTO. China has never changed its position on the "One China" debate and
makes every attempt to "impose" the principle of "One China." This is why China
only ceased to insist on the wording-Taiwan would have to join the WTO as "a cus-
toms territory of China"-when it was made impossible by the opposition of the
United States.
2004]
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views Taipei's use of the WTO framework to regulate cross-
strait economic relations as a pro-independence strategy and
therefore insists that contacts between the two sides are inter-
nal matters not to be conducted under WTO auspices. 31 The
Chinese government was advised to prevent the island from us-
ing the WTO as a forum for contacts. 32
China's obstinate attitude in refusing formal talks in the
WTO forum might have something to do with its understanding
of the WTO Agreement in general and its understanding of its
implications for cross-strait trade relations in particular, and
with confidence in its ability to deal with Taipei in the WTO
context. Beijing's reluctance to talk with Taiwan within the
WTO framework is grounded in two factors. First, China per-
ceives the Taiwan issue as an internal Chinese affair, and is not
willing to see a third party, a state, or an international organi-
zation, mediating or interposing between the two sides across
the Taiwan Strait. Second, Beijing is afraid that the WTO,
which is dominated by western countries, might side with Tai-
wan if both China and Taiwan deal with each other within the
WTO forum. 33
Therefore, it was surprising when Shi Guangsheng, China's
foreign trade minister, suggested in an interview with the Fi-
nancial Times on November 25, 2002, that both sides might
meet to discuss particular issues within the WTO. 34 The speech
signified that China was ready to ease its ban on official talks
with rival Taiwan. Shi announced that Beijing was willing to
abide by WTO rules in notifying Taipei of any action that would
affect Taiwanese exporters. He explained that "[currently Tai-
wan and the mainland do not have a normal trading relation-
ship, but both are WTO members.... Consultations on specific
issues can be held between the two sides through their repre-
sentatives in Geneva."35
31. A spokesman for the State Council Office of Taiwan Affairs confirmed this
position in the first official statement issued after Taiwan's accession to the WTO.
See generally http://www.taimeng.org.cn/newsdetail.asp?ID=3270 (last visited Sept.
29, 2004).
32. See, e.g., Guo Pingtan et. al., Cross-Strait Trade Relations in the WTO Con-
text, 17 INTERNAL REFERENCE FOR REFORMS, 33-36 (2001).
33. See, e.g., CAO JIANMING ET. AL., TREATISES ON WTO AND CROSS-STRAIT
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 29-30 (Shanghai: Shanghai Institute of Taiwan Affairs 1999).
34. See Mure Dickie, Taiwan and China Move Closer to Official Talks, FIN.
TIMES (London), Nov. 25, 2002, at 9, available at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/
News/2002/FT-112502.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
35. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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On December 12, 2002, not long after Shi's speech, repre-
sentatives of both China and Taiwan met in Geneva to talk
about China's temporary safeguard measures against Taiwan's
steel imports.36 The meeting between China and Taiwan under
the WTO framework caught the attention of other WTO mem-
bers. China's new stance appears to be a response to Taipei's
protest. The change in attitude is possibly an attempt to resolve
the dilemma posed by Taiwanese requests for WTO talks over
China's recent imposition of tariffs on a range of steel products.
The policy change may also have resulted from pressure by
other WTO members. Under the WTO Agreement, any member
has the right to consult with any other on trade measures, 37 and
China, by refusing to cooperate with Taiwan upon its request,
had put itself at risk of undermining its reputation as a rule-
abiding member. In this sense, Taipei's stated position, which is
to require China to act according to the WTO Agreement within
the WTO framework, is likely to win the sympathy of other
WTO members.
The new development could also be related to China's frus-
tration of non-governmental channels to resolve trade disputes
established after WTO accession. It was once proposed that the
Taiwanese government not bring such disputes to the WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Body.38 However, in order to avoid the deterio-
ration of cross-strait trade, non-governmental organizations
stepped in to help resolve trade disputes. For example, in Feb-
ruary 2002, the Taiwan Steel & Iron Industries Association
(TSIIA) and the China Steel and Iron Industry Association
(CSIIA) met in Taipei and reached a four-point consensus to es-
tablish a mechanism for the resolution of disputes concerning
cross-strait steel trade. Unfortunately, in the absence of compe-
tent governmental authorities, the result of such non-
governmental efforts proved to be limited in resolving cross-
strait trade disputes. For example, although the TSIIA was in-
formed of the temporary safeguard measures and was invited to
discuss the future of steel imports from Taiwan with the CSIIA,
the consultation between the two non-governmental organiza-
tions failed to touch on the issue of consistency of the temporary
safeguard measures in the Safeguard Agreement, central to the
36. See generally http://www.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/FM1092/FM-C-092-
179.htm (last visited Sept. 2004).
37. Cf. infra note 58.
38. See generally http://www.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/FM092/FM-C-092-
179.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
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dispute regarding China's imposition of temporary safeguard
measures against Taiwanese steel imports. In this context,
China notified Taiwan's mission to the WTO in November 2002
of a desire to talk over the steel dispute. China indeed had
overcome its reluctance to address the Taiwan mission by its of-
ficial title, and talks finally started in January 2003.39
A more likely explanation than either outside pressure or
frustration of non-governmental routes is that China has devel-
oped a new understanding of the features of the WTO and Tai-
wan's status in the WTO. As for its perception of the WTO's na-
ture, first, regardless of whether the international trading
community is obligated to comply with the "One China" princi-
ple, nothing in the WTO Agreement can be interpreted to negate
the principle. Second, the WTO is basically a functionalist in-
ternational organization, concerned solely with trade issues. It
is trade interests, not a political agenda, that prompt members
to take advantage of the mechanisms available in the WTO.
With its accession to the WTO, Taiwan acquired member-
ship in a club available to sovereign states, which, even without
direct talks with the Mainland, elevates its status. On the other
hand, since Taiwan did not accede to the WTO as a sovereign
state, but as a "Separate Customs Territory," its status would
not be elevated to that of a sovereign state, no matter how and
what Taipei does in the WTO. In other words, Taiwan will not
acquire statehood by virtue of its talks with China or any other
WTO member. Thus it is reasonable for Beijing to talk with
Taipei if circumstances make such talks necessary, but Beijing
will proceed in a cautious and inconspicuous manner.
This leaves open the possibility that Beijing will try to limit
these talks to private bilateral contacts before China clarifies
whether such "consultations" in Geneva could be held under the
WTO umbrella. 40 Taipei has made it clear that such an ar-
rangement would be unacceptable to Taiwan. 41
39. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
40. In the WTO, consultations are a part of the formal process for dispute set-
tlement. A consultation must be initiated by a formal request, which is circulated to
all the WTO members through the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. See Understand-
ing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art III, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226. In contrast, private bilateral talks can be held in
an informal way and can be interpreted as irrelevant to the formal process of dispute
settlement.
41. The Financial Times quoted one Taiwanese trade official as saying: "I can't
see any reason why they cannot negotiate under the framework of the WTO."
Dickie, supra note 34, at 9.
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II. CROSS-STRAIT TRADE RELATIONS IN A BROADER
CONTEXT: BUSINESS ENTHUSIASM VERSUS
GOVERNMENTAL INDIFFERENCE
Both China and Taiwan are now WTO members. Accession
of both sides of the Taiwan Strait to the WTO has aroused in-
teresting speculations about the trend of cross-strait trade rela-
tions. Existing WTO members closely watch interactions be-
tween the two new rival members.
Indeed, trade has surged across the Strait. Cross-strait
trade rose from $32.34 billion in 2001 to $42.30 billion in 2002
and $58.37 billion in 2003.42 China has become Taiwan's top
trade partner; Taipei's trade with Beijing accounting for 24.5%
of Taiwan's total trade.43 The trade surplus of Taiwan with
China rose from $18.16 billion in 2001 to $24.40 billion in
2003.44
However, surging trade is primarily a result of business ex-
changes, and trade relations between China and Taiwan remain
hampered by general cross-strait relations. The two sides have
always maintained different viewpoints regarding certain politi-
cal issues. The possibility of sudden confrontation across the
Strait is remote, however. Still, there have been no significant
changes for the better. From China's perspective, Taipei's re-
fusal to recognize the "One China" principle prevents the
Mainland from improving cross-strait relations, while in the
eyes of Taipei, the Mainland's military deployment against Tai-
wan and refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Tai-
wan issue pose a threat.
Cross-strait trade relations are often part of a more general
problem and susceptible to the ups and downs of the broader re-
lationship. Trade measures of either side shall be perceived in
the context of a much broader bilateral relation. Whenever
42. See Xinhua News Agency Domestic Service, Beijing, China Issues Policy
Paper on Direct Links with Taiwan, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Dec. 18, 2003,
LEXIS, News Library, Bbcmir File; Xinhua General News Service, Cross-Straits
Trade, Economic Cooperation Maintain Momentum, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 4,
2002, LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File; Sofia Wu, Cross-Strait Trade Hits New
High, CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY-TAIWAN, Jan. 15, 2004, LEXIS, News File, Cenews
File.
43. An Analysis of Cross-Strait Trade, Board of Foreign Trade of Taiwan, Min-
istry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan, at http://ekm92.trade.gov.tw/BOFT/web/reportlist
.jsp?databaseid=DB009&categoryid=CAT3182 (Mar. 1, 2004).
44. The statistical data are available at the website of the Board of Foreign
Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan, http://cus.moeaboft.gov.tw (last visited
Oct. 22, 2004).
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there is a d6tente in the Taiwan Strait, trade is no longer an is-
sue between Beijing and Taipei. When cross-strait relations de-
teriorate, both sides accuse each other of creating trade barriers,
which seems to represent the usual business of both Beijing and
Taipei. The following examples are illustrative.
For many years Taiwan has discriminatorily treated im-
ports from the Mainland while enjoying a trade surplus in its
trade with mainland China. This was not a serious problem in
times of "good cross-strait relations." In fact, the two Koo-Wang
Talks between the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) of Taiwan
and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait
(ARATS) of the Mainland in 1993 and 1998, 45 which were a
symbol of d6tente across the Strait, were followed by surging
imports and investment from Taiwan. But not long after Tai-
wan's President Chen Shui-bian advocated the "One Side, One
Country" stance in August 2002 by stating "[1]et's make it clear,
there is one county on each side of the Taiwan Strait,"'46 and the
cross-strait relations came to a stalemate, did China decide to
apply final safeguard measures against imports from Taiwan 47
and accuse Taiwan of procrastinating on the establishment of
the 'Three Links"-direct exchanges in mail, transportation,
and trading between the two sides. 48 Taiwan also exhibited the
45. In the early 1990s, in order to establish a formal communication channel
between the two sides, Taiwan set up the SEF and China set up the ARATS. In
1993, Koo Chen-fu, chairman of Taiwan's SEF, and Wang Daohan, chairman of
China's ARATS, met for the first time in Singapore and reached four agreements
and the "One China, Separate Interpretation" consensus. United Daily News, Chen:
We Can Accept 'Separate Interpretations', available at http://www.taiwanheadlines.
gov.tw/20000628/20000628pl.html (June 28, 2000). The Koo-Wang Talks were sus-
pended by Beijing since mid-1995 to protest Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's high-
profile visit to Cornell University in the United States. Ralph A. Cossa, Koo-Wang
Talks: Can the 'Use of Force' Dispute be Resolved?, PACIFIC FORUM CSIS, available at
http://www.taiwansecurity.org/CSIS-Pacnet-39.htm (Oct. 9, 1998). They were re-
sumed in 1998 when Koo and Wang met in China. See id.
46. Lilian Wu, Mac Issues Position Paper on One Side, One Country, CENTRAL
NEWS AGENCY-TAIWAN, LEXIS, News Library, Cenews File (Aug. 7, 2002).
47. See infra notes 55-56.
48. The "Three Links" refers to direct exchanges in mail, transportation, and
trading between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. These exchange services were
suspended in the late 1940s when Kuomintang withdrew from the Mainland to Tai-
wan. Since the 1990s, with the surging trade and investment, the two sides have
been talking about, and the business circles have been pressing for, opening the
"Three Links." However, all the efforts have so far produced no results, for China
insists that implementing direct links requires acceptance of the "One China" policy,
while Taiwan sees the condition as Beijing's hidden agenda to "suppress and belittle
Taiwan in the international community." Central News Agency, MAC Calls 'One
China' Provision for Direct Links Unaccepatable, available at http://www.taiwan
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same behavioral pattern. For example, when China rebuffed
the DPP administration's policy of progressive independence,
Taiwan responded by adopting the Special Safeguard Mecha-
nism Against Products from Mainland, which imposed a ceiling
for prospective Taiwanese investment on the Mainland, and ac-
cused China of politicizing trade relations by imposing anti-
dumping investigations and safeguard measures.
The WTO should not be expected to ease the political fissure
between the two sides. In fact, the difficulties of managing
cross-strait economic ties after the WTO accession have been
underlined by dimming hopes for establishing the "Three
Links." Taiwan has banned direct trade, transport, and postal
links with mainland China since 1949. The only exception to
the absence of the "Three Links" is the so-called "Mini Three
Links" between the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu and
the Chinese coast.49 Even the high-profile chartered flights
around the Chinese New Year in 2003 cannot be seen as a
breakthrough. Although Taipei allowed local airlines to fly to
destinations on the Mainland for the first time, it insisted that
flights include a stop in Hong Kong or Macau and did not permit
Mainland carriers to take part.
III. FACILITATING CROSS-STRAIT TRADE RELATIONS
WITHIN THE WTO FRAMEWORK
Cross-strait trade relations within the WTO framework are
not entirely hopeless. As an old Chinese proverb states, "good
fortune lieth within bad." There are several factors that would
contribute to a minimum degree of normal relations between
China and Taiwan in the WTO.
First, since Taipei eased its ban on trade relations in 1987,
China and Taiwan have been natural trade partners due to
their geographical, racial, linguistic, and cultural proximity.
There is no reason to believe, particularly in an era of globaliza-
security.org/CNA/2003/CNA-071903.htm (July 19, 2003). Therefore, trade links
across the Strait still involve substantial indirect transportation costs.
49. The Provisional Implementation of the "Mini-Three Links" between the
Offshore Islands of Kinmen and Matsu and Mainland China, adopted at the end of
2000, authorizes trade between the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu and the
Chinese coast. See Mainland Affairs Council, Overview of the Provisional Implemen-
tation of 'Mini-three-links' Between the Offshore Islands of Kinmen & Matsu and
Mainland China, available at http://www.mac.gov.tw/englishienglish/macpolicy/
mtlink2.htm (Dec. 18, 2000).
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tion, that such natural trade relations would be severed com-
pletely by political contentions.
It is conspicuous that both China and Taiwan have used in-
ternal trade powers to influence or manipulate their relations
with each other. Beijing is pressing its skillfully designed
"business leverage for containing Taiwan politics" approach,
which induces Taiwanese business with business opportunities
and potential on the Mainland and in turn causes Taiwanese
businessmen to press the Taiwan authority to, for example, lift
the ban on direct links.50 The expected potential benefits from
the expansion of cross-strait trade would result in tremendous
pressure on the Taiwanese government for further lifting bans
on trade between the two sides. In this context, there would be
a possibility that Taiwan would be induced to yield to China's
demand: recognizing the "One China" principle. If Taiwan
ceases correlating cross-strait trade to "special nation-nation
trade,"51 or recognizes cross-strait trade as domestic trade, Tai-
wanese businesses would possibly be given privileges in China
vis-A-vis businesses from other WTO members. For example,
China has made clear that if cross-strait transportation services
are defined as domestic services, Taiwanese businesses will en-
joy the privileges available to domestic shipping companies pre-
sumably under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS).52 Taiwanese businesses are keen on tap-
ping the Chinese market and taking the lead when China, pur-
suant to its commitments regarding WTO accession, begins to
gradually open its market to foreign businesses. In order to
meet the benchmark that China has set, Taiwanese businesses
would turn to the Taiwanese government for recognition of the
"One China" principle. 53
50. See, e.g., Liberty Times, at www.libertytimes.com.tw/2002/new/may/22/
today-t2.htm (May 22, 2002).
51. It was Taiwan's former President Lee Teng-hui who, for the first time, for-
mally defined the cross-strait relation as "a relation between two states, or at least
that between two special nations" when he was interviewed by a Voice of Germany
journalist on July 9, 1999. Lee Teng-hui, Views on Cross-Taiwan Strait Ties: Re-
sponses to Questions Submitted by Deutsche Welle (Voice of Germany), TAIPEI.ORG,
http://www.taipei.org/presslLee.view.htm (July 9, 1999).
52. Article 2(1) of the UNCLOS provides that a coastal state has sovereignty
over its territorial sea. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1982, art. II, para. 1, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 400 (entered into force
Nov. 16, 1994). However, it is controversial to argue that this provision allows a
coastal state that is a contracting party to both the UNCLOS and the WTO Agree-
ment to evade its WTO obligation regarding opening marine transport.
53. In 2002, Wang Yongqing, an influential industrial tycoon of Taiwan, re-
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Second, the WTO Agreement may be applied to trade rela-
tions between China and Taiwan. The WTO can be a constrain-
ing factor to both sides of the Taiwan Strait in their existing
trade relations, while it is unable to reconcile the volatile cross-
strait relations. The WTO Agreement places both Beijing and
Taipei under a legal framework that appeals to widely accepted
principles and norms used by the international community. It
drives the laws of both sides closer to each other. As empirical
evidence has shown, the more similarity between Beijing and
Taipei, the more likely they will deal with each other.5 4
Third, the multilateral framework of the WTO creates many
occasions for both sides of the Taiwan Strait to contact or even
work with each other. Some occasions call for bilateral consul-
tations in the event of trade measures by mainland China or
Taiwan that specifically address or affect the other side, 55 or in
the event of trade disputes.5 6 For example, after Taiwan's ac-
cession to the WTO on March 23, 2002, China announced the
launching of an anti-dumping investigation on steel imports
from Taiwan. Not long after the announcement, an anti-
dumping investigation was launched against imports of PVC
from Taiwan. On May 24, 2002, China declared its intention to
impose temporary safeguard measures 57 on some steel products
from Taiwan.58 Under the WTO Agreement, such trade meas-
portedly called for the Taiwanese Government to recognize the so-called "92 Consen-
sus," which would be equivalent to recognizing the "One China, Separate Interpreta-
tions" stance. See Central News Agency, supra note 15.
54. It has often been observed that as the economic and political systems of
both sides have gradually become more similar, both sides have established more
trade links. In fact, the Taiwan side under the Kuomintang regime once proposed
that the two sides would become united if the Mainland were to become democra-
tized. See Cossa, supra note 45.
55. See, e.g., GATS Agreement, supra note 7, art. XXII, § 1.
56. See, e.g., Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes, WTO Agreement annex 2, art. 4, § 2.
57. See Agreement on Safeguards, WTO Agreement, annex 1A. A WTO mem-
ber may apply temporary safeguard measures (e.g. a tariff or quota) for a period of
six months to prevent surging imports of foreign products, regardless of origin, from
injuring its domestic industry; after six months, the country invoking the safeguard
must decide whether to apply permanent safeguards or to remove the temporary
safeguards. Id.
58. In order to prevent surplus steel products on the international market from
flooding into the Chinese market, the Chinese Government introduced temporary
safeguard measures on imports of some steel products starting on May 24, 2002.
China Selectively Re-imposes Import Tariffs on Cold-rolled Steel Sheets; Russia Ex-
presses Surprise, at http://www.interfax.com/com?item=Chin&pg=O&id=5681204
&req= (Jan. 15, 2004). These measures imposed a tariff quota on imports of nine
kinds of steel products of forty-eight tariff numbers, namely ordinary medium plate,
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ures would call for consultations. Similarly, pursuant to the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes, 59 when a dispute arises between the two sides
it could also possibly lead to consultations. Since either side's
nonconforming trade policies towards the other 60 harbors pro-
spective disputes between the two sides,6 1 it would not be sur-
prising to see their trade relations evolve into disputes submit-
ted before the Dispute Settlement Body and give rise to
consultations. 62
Some occasions call for direct contact in the multilateral
context, for example, in the context of the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism. According to the trade policy review procedures,
upon the request of an interested member, the member whose
trade policy is to be reviewed is required to provide the request-
ing member with certain information.63 During the eight year
transitional period, other WTO members are scrutinizing
China's trade policy. 64 Having substantial interests in China,
Taiwan is keenly interested in China's trade policy, particularly
as to whether China will honor its commitments. In the first
session of Trade Policy Review in 2002, for example, Taiwan's
representative addressed directly to his Chinese counterpart
various questions, covering slash of tariffs, quota administra-
tion, prohibition of import of used electronic appliances, beer,
films, etc.65
ordinary sheet, silicon steel, stainless plate, coil rod, section, seamless tube, and bil-
let, with a term of 180 days. A portion of these steel products was from Taiwan.
59. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, WTO Agreement annex 2, art. 4, § 2 ("Each Member undertakes to accord
sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for consultation re-
garding any representations made by another Member concerning measures affect-
ing the operation of any covered agreement taken within the territory of the for-
mer.").
60. For a discussion of the inconsistency between Taipei's trade policies and the
WTO Agreement, see Huang Jie, Cross-Strait Trade Relations Deviating from the
WTO Principles, 3 CHINA REV., 2002, at 48-50.
61. Qingjiang Kong, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Cross-Strait
Trade Relations, 9 CHINA REV. 57, 57 (2002).
62. Qingjiang Kong, Can the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism Resolve
Trade Disputes between China and Taiwan?, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 747, 756-58 (2002).
63. See, e.g., GATS Agreement, supra note 7, art. XXII, § 1.
64. See Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, Nov. 10,
2001, WT[L/432, part I, § 18, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t
WT/L/432.doc.
65. In the report, China has passed the Transitional Trade Policy Review, the
Xinhua News Agency revealed that "Taipei China" together with 15 other WTO
members addressed to China their respective concerns during the reviewing process.
See generally http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002-12/20/content_665897.htm
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Fourth, the experience of China and Taiwan in the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)66 may serve as a lesson
for their dealing with each other in the WTO.67 So far, the two
sides have maintained a normal business-like relation in the
APEC.68
Finally, it should be noted that the approach of each side af-
fects the response of the other. For example, China's attitude
toward talks in the WTO could be a result of Taiwan's business-
like approach in the WTO. It is too early for China, sensitive to
Taiwan's every move, to say whether Taipei has behaved well in
the WTO. However, if Beijing senses Taiwan's business-like at-
titude in the WTO, it will be encouraged to deal with Taipei un-
der the WTO framework.
It is a positive sign that China can act in a non-political
manner with Taipei, and Taipei can take a business-like atti-
tude in its relation with Beijing on international occasions. The
best examples are the two trade disputes regarding antidump-
ing and temporary safeguard measures in the post-WTO era.
Indeed Beijing, against its WTO obligation, did not inform the
Taiwanese government, but rather informed only the Taiwanese
companies or industry concerned in such investigations. 69 Nev-
(last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
66. APEC is the premier forum for facilitating economic growth, cooperation,
trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region. Both China and Taiwan are mem-
ber economies of the APEC. However, Taiwan's official title in the APEC is "Chinese
Taipei."
67. On October 2, 1991, Director General Qin Huasun of China's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and then Chairman of Senior Officials' Meeting of the APEC, signed
a Memorandum of Understanding, which agreed on the issues relating to entry of
China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan into the APEC. See Monique Chu, Taiwan Should
Consider Hosting APEC: Analysts, TAIPEI TIMES, available at http://www.taiwan
security.orgITT/2001/TT-021301.htm (Feb. 13, 2001). Taiwan acceded to the APEC
as an independent economy.
68. The only exception to this pattern was the 2001 APEC Summit in Shang-
hai. Prior to the Summit, the general practice had been for Taiwan to send a minis-
terial level official to attend annual APEC summit meetings. For this Summit, Tai-
wan's President Chen Shuibian intended to attend personally. After this was
rejected, he ordered the dispatch of Li Yuanzu, one of his former Vice Presidents,
which was again rejected. As a result, Taiwan was absent from the Summit. Chen
Shuibian's move was regarded as a sort of political maneuvering-without such ma-
neuvering, the 2001 APEC Summit would have been very different. For a discussion
of China's approach towards Taiwan in the APEC, see A STUDY OF APEC AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS (Li Qiongli et. al. eds., Chinese Taipei
APEC Research Center 2001).
69. When an antidumping investigation is instigated, public notice must be
given to interested parties, including exporting WTO members and other known ex-
porters. Agreement on Implementation of Art. VI of the GATT 1994, WTO Agree-
ment annex 1A, art. 12.
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ertheless, when the Taiwanese mission for the WTO dissented
by addressing China's WTO mission, Beijing remedied its proce-
dures. 70 As it was speculated that China's new flexibility could
open a channel for the first formal talks between the two sides
after the WTO accession, Yen Ching-chang, chief representative
of Taiwan's delegation to the WTO, advised that no political im-
plications should be attached to the consultations between the
two sides under the WTO framework. 71
CONCLUSION
Accession of both China and Taiwan to the WTO has wit-
nessed the coexistence of an opportunity-finding fever among
businesses and a sluggish policy adjustment between govern-
ments across the Taiwan Strait. The compelling trade forces
and entangling political contentions over Taiwan's status are
the result of coexisting business enthusiasm and governmental
indifference. Given that the contention between China and
Taiwan is a non-amenable zero-sum game by nature, the WTO
should not be expected to ease the political fissure between the
two sides. The post-WTO diplomatic struggle between China
and Taiwan around Taipei's identification in the WTO illus-
trates this tension. Nevertheless, the fact that both Beijing and
Taipei are in the WTO will be useful in providing an arena for
self-justification for either side whenever a minimum d6tente
exists across the Taiwan Strait.
Given the functionalist nature of the WTO, a formula
agreeable to Taiwan, supported by the international trading
community, and acceptable to China should be established for
the relationship between China and Taiwan in the WTO. To
this end, the two sides should be prompted to take business-like
approaches towards each other in the WTO. Beijing should be
urged to fulfill its obligations under the WTO Agreement, and
Taipei should be urged not to push Beijing by attempting to take
advantage of the WTO to its political end.
70. Joyce Huang, Taiwan and China to go to WTO Mat over steel, TAIPEI TIMES,
at P1, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2002/12/06/
186044 (Dec. 6, 2002).
71. See 'Downgrade' hampers China-Taiwan WTO talks, ASIA TIMES ON-LINE,
at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/china/DL07Ad04.html (Dec. 7, 2002).
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